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Abstract 
This study investigates empirically the effect of investment decision on financing decision. To obtain the 
objectives, the data required, ranging from 2004 through 2013 were collected from the financial statements of all 
the banking firms listed in Karachi Stock exchange. Investment opportunity and actual investment were used as 
proxies of investment decision. Profitability and firm size were used as control variables. Multiple regression 
models were used to estimate the variables of interest. It was concluded that investment opportunity had 
significant effect on financing decision; however, the effects have no particular pattern. Furthermore, actual 
investment had no impact on financing decision.  
Keywords: Banking Sector, Investment Decision, Financing Decision, Multiple Regression Model 
 
1.0 Introduction  
The leverage irrelevant proposition has been widely discussed in finance literature. Production decision is 
administrated exclusively by an objective standard with no regard to subjective preferences of individual that go 
into their expenditure (consumption) decisions in the given complete and perfect capital market (Copeland, 
Weston, Shastri, & Education, 1983). This contention is consistent with Williams who has observed firstly the 
financial policy irrelevant proposition in 1938 (Chen, 1978). The study of (Modigliani & Miller, 1958) also 
support the financing irrelevant proposition. (Miller, 1977), (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980) have also been 
supported the financing irrelevant proposition. 
Managers are having better information than the outside investors, in the real world, which is known as 
asymmetry information (Brigham et al., 1999). Asymmetry information is a cause of conflicting investor 
preferences and harmony will not acquire even between the final shareholders in incomplete market (Taggart, 
1980). Asymmetry information involves different theories which support financial decision relevance proposal, 
just like balancing theory (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980b), (Gardner & Trzcinka, 1992), (Bayless & Diltz, 1994), 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1979), pecking order theory (Myers, 1984), (Myers & Majluf, 1984), trade 
off theory (Brigham et al. 1999) or signaling theory (Megginson, Megginson, & Meggison, 1997). 
The mix result among the different financing decision relevancy theories is shown by the empirical evidence. A 
few studies support the balancing theory, like (Crutchley & Hansen, 1989), (Kale, Noe, & Ramirez, 1991), and 
(Gardner & Trzcinka, 1992). Few studies support the pecking order theory, including (Carleton & Silberman, 
1977), (Baskin, 1989), (Barton, Hill, & Sundaram, 1989), (Bayless & Diltz, 1994), (Adedeji, 1998; Shyam-
Sunder &Myers, 1999). Other studies support mixture of both two theories, such as ( Jensen, Solberg, & Zorn, 
1992) and (Griner & Gordon, 1995) support pecking order theory and balancing theory both.  
1.1 Balancing Theory 
Brigham et al. (1999) have examined the behavior of managers on the basis of business risk. They have 
predicted that in less risky conditions firms use more debts and in high risky conditions firms use fewer debts. 
Thus, in less risky conditions, there should be a positive influence of growth on financing decision, and in high 
risky conditions, there should be a negative influence of growth on financing decision. 
1.2 Pecking Order Theory 
 Myers and Majluf (1984) have argued that the use of internal funds is the preference of firms. If there is 
a need of external funds, managers opt debt financing instead of issuance the new equity. It is supposed that 
profitability is constant relatively; the theory indicated that there is a positive influence of investments on the 
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financing decision. If firms violate any financing order, it will lead to high investment risk or financial 
difficulties. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 Analyzing the effect of investment decision on financing decision in banking sector of Pakistan is the 
core issue to be addressed. The center of attention of the study is whether the effect of investment decision is 
going to define the financing decision or not.  The nature of present research gap is quite difficult to understand 
as the said topic is critically analyzed by various researchers in way of how the investment decision is going to 
define the financing decision for a business. In addition to the above problem, the said effect must be analyzed 
by controlling the effect of firm size and profitability. 
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
 Investigate whether investment decision influence financing decision. 
 Attempt to control the effect of firm size and profitability on financing decision. 
1.5 Organization of the Study 
The rest part of the study is organized as: section two is review of the literature of the existing relationship 
between investment decision and financing decision and development of hypothesis. Section three includes the 
research methodology. Section four explains the empirical results and discussions. Section five consists of 
conclusion and directions for the future studies. 
 
2.0 Review of Literature and Hypothesis 
Fisher separation theorem argued that managers of a company make firstly the investment decision and secondly 
they make financing decision, but both the decisions are independently. However, if it is supposed that 
asymmetry information exists, the separation cannot be held for the long period of time. To make the investment 
decision, the behavior of the managers cannot directly observed by the outside investors. Hence, they always try 
to observe the behavior of managers in other side (financing decision) to access the decision of investment. 
Investment decision cannot observe directly. Myers (1977)acquaints the term investment opportunity set which 
means the extent to which the firm value depends on future optional expenditures by the firm. There are a 
number of proxies in finance literature and accounting to  capture Myers’ view of investment opportunity set 
(IOS), just like Gaver and Gaver (1993), Smith Jr and Watts (1992). There are three kinds of these proxies 
classified by Kallapur and Trombley (1999): investment-based proxies, price-based proxies and variance 
measures. They have observed that price-based proxies are better than other two proxies of investment 
opportunity set to be associated to realized growth as benchmark. On the basis of Fisher separation theorem, 
investment decision effects financing decision but it is supposed that asymmetry information exists. 
 Wang, Huang, and Wang (2010) have explained that as regard to the lifecycle stage of a company, there 
is inconsistent impact of investment decision on borrowing and borrowing on investment decision at different 
levels. Which means the capital market is imperfect.  
 Kaaro (2002) has highlighted that the level of risk is the element which cause the effect of investment 
decision on financing decision. He further explained that in low risky conditions companies use more funds for 
investment and use low funds in high risky conditions. 
 Abbott (2001) has indicated that there is negative correlation between the market debt-to-equity ratios 
and investment opportunity set movements. Whereas book debt-to-equity ratios have positive correlation with 
investment opportunity set movements. 
 Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) have narrated that if there is no perfect competition between the 
financial markets then there is a relationship between the financing decision and the investment decision. If the 
economic conditions getting better then the percentage of equity financing will be greater with respect to the 
debt. If the past economics conditions are on average lesser, the portion of equity financing and portion of types 
of financing will be greater. And the industry projects having low existence rate are highly financed by equity. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is an association between Investment opportunity and financing decision. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a linkage between realized growth (actual investment) and financing decision. 
 
2.1 Research Gap 
On the basis of Fisher separation theorem, investment decision effects financing decision but it is supposed that 
asymmetry information exists.Kallapur and Trombley (1999) have investigated that actual investment or realized 
growth and future growth both to observe the investment decisions that affect the financing decision. But in 
above studies, it is not cleared that what is the relationship between investment decision and financing decision. 
This study will attempt to observe the association between the said variables. 
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2.2Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the above theoretical framework, the investment decision (independent variable) affects the financing decision 
(dependent variable), and the return on assets and firm size are the control variables. 
 
3.0 Data and Research Methodology 
The data from 2004 through 2010 is used in this study. To calculate the growth of total assets and sales growth, 
the data of period 2003 is also used. The data consists of annual financial reports of all banking firms of Pakistan 
which are listed in Karachi Stock Exchange. Panel data regression model is used to analyze the impact of 
investment decision on financing decision. 
3.1 Variables Description 
The variables used in this study are generally measured by following the past studies. 
Three types of variables are used, discussed below: 
3.1.1 Dependent Variable 
Financing decision (financial leverage) is to be considered as dependent variable measured in terms of total debt 
to total assets ratio. It is computed as: 
Financial Leverage (FL) = Total Debt / Total Assets  (Osuji, Odita, 2012) 
3.1.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variable is investment decision. 
3.1.2.1 Investment Decision 
Investment decision includes two variables which are actual investment and investment opportunity. 
Actual Investment: Actual investment is measured as total assets growth and sales growth of banks over a 
period of time. The formula of growth is as under: 
Total Assets Growth (TAG) = (TA t-TA t-1) / TA t-1  (Kaaro, 2002) 
Sales Growth (SG) = (S t-S t-1) / S t-1  (Kaaro, 2002) 
Investment Opportunity: Investment opportunity is measured by two variables of earnings per share to stock 
price (EPSSP) and capital intensiveness. 
EPSSP= Earnings per share / Stock price (Kaaro, 2002) 
Capital Intensiveness (CI) = Total equity / Sales (Kaaro, 2002) 
3.1.3 Control Variables 
The control variables of the study are following: 
Firm Size (FS): It is the size of bank and measured as logarithm of total assets (Osuji, Odita, 2012) at the end of 
year. Firm size may influence the financing decision of banks. 
Return on Assets (ROA): Return on assets is measured in terms of profit after tax to total assets ratio at the end 
of financial year. It shows the ability of banks to create profits by utilizing its assets. 
ROA= Profit after tax / Total Assets  (Osuji, Odita, 2012) 
3.2 Econometric Modeling 
In order to test the hypothesis the study uses multiple regression models on the sample data of firms and 
following model is developed: 
FLit= β0 +β1TAGit+β2SGit+β3EPSSPit+β4CIit+β5FSit +β6ROAit+... (1) 
Where; Financial leverage (FL) is the dependent variables of the present study of banking firms over period of 
time t, and β1……… β6are the intercept terms for the selected set of independent variables. Total assets growth 
(TAG), sales growth (SG), earnings per share to stock price (EPSSP) and capital intensiveness (CI) are the 
independent variables, and firm size (FS) and return on assets (ROE) are the controlling variables in the above 
model. 
 
Investment Decision Financing Decision 
 
Return on Assets 
Firm Size 
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4.0 Empirical Results 
The study has explained the outcomes of panel data regression analysis to analyze the impact of investment 
decision on financing decision of banking firms in this section.  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The year-by-year (before and after financial crisis) descriptive statistics outcomes of annual data from 2004 to 
2013 said that the mean value of financial leverage in 2004 is 0.1299 but it decreased in 2005. In 2006 and 2007 
the mean value of financial leverage is increased. In 2008 and 2009, there is diminishing growth in financial 
leverage, it is slightly increased in 2010 and 2011 (11.95 and 14.36), but in 2012 and 2013, there is dramatically 
diminishing growth. There is one possible explanation with the results. Many banking firms have been lost of 
their profits during the period of global financial crisis. Global financial crisis showed their effect in the middle 
of 2007-2008, stock markets have fallen in all over the world and larger institutions have crashed. On the other 
side, the global financial crisis influence the livelihood of everyone connected in the world. In 2009 the banking 
firms start the recovery of their profits. The internal funding reduced due to the lost of profits. Pecking order 
theory (Myers and Majluf 1984)gives preference of external debt over financing new equity. 
 The mean value of TAG and SG is 0.3884 and 0.4804 respectively in 2004. The mean values of TAG 
and SG are increased in 2005 and decreased in 2006 and the value of TAG and SG increased in 2007, in 2009 
and 2010, both the variables are decreased, but increased in 2011. In 2008 and 2012, the mean value of TAG 
increased but the mean value of SG decreased. In 2013 mean values of both variables are decreased. The 
variation of TAG and SG is greater. These variables represent the realized growth. 
EPSSP’s mean value as proxy of investment opportunity is positive in 2004 through 2007, but it is negative in 
2008 through 2010. It is also positive in 2011 and 2012 and again negative in 2013.The results report that 
because of economic crisis, the firms suffer losses, in 2011, the firms start the recovery of the losses and increase 
the performance. Another possibility of explanation can be based on compensation theory. This theory explains 
that if there is existence of upper and lower bonus plan, the managers of firms might prefer to opt take a bad in 
period of 2004 to 2009 to get high bonus in the period of 2010 to 2013 (Healy, 1985). The mean value of CI, 
which is also a proxy of investment opportunity, is higher in 2006 (2.8661) and lower in 2013 (1.0274). The 
value of capital intensive is higher in 2004 (2.4556), 2006 (2.8661) and 2007 (2.1199), which means in these 
periods the banking firms are more capital intensive. The variations in CI are relatively low. 
The mean value of ROA is negative in the periods of 2008 through 2010. Because of global financial crisis many 
banking firms suffer loss. In the period of 2010, many banking firms start recovery, improve the performance 
and increase the ROA. This means that in the period of financial crisis the performance of firms affect badly. 
The maximum mean size of banking firms is in 2013 (8.4825) and the minimum in 2006 (7.8536). There is 
increasing growth in the size of banking firms from 2006 to 2013. The FS is slightly decreased in the period of 
2006. 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
Table 1 reports the year-by-year (before and after financial crisis) regression analysis results of total debts to 
total assets. TAG is found to be negatively significant in the period of 2012 (Coef.= -0.1691, t= -2.1193) and 
2013 (Coef.= -0.1567, t= -2.6519) at the significance level of 0.05. SG has significant positive impact on FL 
only in the period of 2011 (Coef.= 0.1241, t= 1.8996) at 0.10 significance level. EPSSP as a proxy of investment 
opportunity is significant positive in 2011(Coef.= 0.6232, t= 3.0426) and 2012 (Coef.= 0.3589, t= 2.6943) only. 
These periods represent economic normal (less uncertainty conditions) indicating that there are more investment 
opportunities. CI has significant positive impact on FL in all the years (both in high and less risky conditions) at 
the level of significance of 0.01. Results show that in less uncertainty conditions the banking firms are more 
capital intensive as the values of t statistics are higher in the period of economic normal. The FS has inconsistent 
impact on FL. FS is mostly significant in economic normal but insignificant in the period of economic crisis 
(high uncertainty conditions). ROA has significant impact on FL in the period of 2004 through 2007, 2010 and 
2011. The variation in coefficient of determination (R2) is relatively low. 
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Table 1: Regression Analysis of Total Debt to Total Assets (t-value in Parenthesis) 
Variab
le 
Years 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Consta
nt 
-0.1338 
0.0387 0.3505 
0.8270
*** 
-
0.0458 
-
0.6185
** 
-
0.7674
*** -0.2767 
0.1035*
** -0.0231 
  
(-
0.6593) (0.075
3) 
(1.069
2) 
(3.093
7) 
(-
0.3384
) 
(-
2.2248
) 
(-
4.3901
) 
(-
1.4074) 
(3.0388
) 
(-
0.4142) 
TAG 
-0.0712 
0.0116 0.0642 
-
0.0757 0.0061 
-
0.1783 
-
0.0115 0.0137 
-
0.1691*
* 
-
0.1567*
* 
  
(-
1.4404) (0.079
5) 
(0.662
9) 
(-
0.7166
) 
(0.119
4) 
(-
0.8443
) 
(-
0.1260
) 
(0.1992
) 
(-
2.1193) 
(-
2.6519) 
SG 
0.0346 -
0.0309 0.0039 
-
0.1466 0.0518 0.2551 0.0879 0.1241* -0.0450 0.1480 
  
(0.6300
) 
(-
0.2968
) 
(0.038
1) 
(-
1.3997
) 
(0.723
3) 
(1.542
2) 
(0.919
6) 
(1.8996
) 
(-
1.2918) 
(1.6448
) 
EPSSP 
-0.6300 
0.0595 
-
0.0994 
-
0.0638 0.1006 0.3547 0.3230 
0.6232*
** 
0.3589*
* -0.0631 
  
(-
0.3289) (0.729
6) 
(-
0.7570
) 
(-
0.1728
) 
(0.395
0) 
(0.496
9) 
(1.197
3) 
(3.0426
) 
(2.6943
) 
(-
0.2645) 
CI 
0.2990*
** 
0.4192
*** 
0.4371
*** 
0.4627
*** 
0.7709
*** 
1.0561
*** 
0.7410
*** 
0.8055*
** 
1.0993*
** 
1.0538*
** 
  
(6.9591
) 
(3.005
1) 
(3.319
3) 
(3.969
1) 
(9.541
7) 
(9.766
9) 
(13.23
27) 
(12.576
2) 
(30.589
0) 
(22.916
5) 
FS 0.0909 
-
0.0056 
-
0.1062 
-
0.2322
** 0.0202 
0.2270
* 
0.2326
*** 0.0735 
-
0.0997*
** 0.0295 
  
 
(0.9094
) 
(-
0.0220
) 
(-
0.7216
) 
(-
2.5203
) 
(0.263
0) 
(1.823
0) 
(4.024
8) 
(1.4111
) 
(-
2.8769) 
(0.4255
) 
ROA 
1.0557*
** 
1.1238
*** 
0.9469
*** 
0.9606
*** 
-
0.5862 
-
0.3020 
-
0.6737
*** 
-
0.2863*
** 0.0602 -0.1033 
  
(18.015
7) 
(7.082
6) 
(9.610
6) 
(11.58
89) 
(-
0.5861
) 
(-
0.9045
) 
(-
5.6981
) 
(-
3.0790) 
(0.8759
) 
(-
1.1065) 
    
R2 0.9970 0.9677 0.9561 0.9636 0.9712 0.9538 0.9799 0.9880 0.9959 0.9880 
Adjust
ed R2 0.9916 0.9314 0.9232 0.9362 0.9513 0.9218 0.9660 0.9796 0.9930 0.9797 
F 
185.376
7*** 
26.654
6*** 
29.048
8*** 
35.265
2*** 
48.749
6*** 
29.804
9*** 
70.542
0*** 
118.531
7*** 
349.750
7*** 
118.911
2*** 
Note: *Significant at 0.1; **Significant at 0.05: ***Significant at 0.01 
Notes: TAG is total assets growth; SG is sales growth; EPSSP is earning per share to stock price; CI is capital 
intensiveness; FS is firm size; ROA is return on assets 
4.3 A COMBINED ANALYSIS FROM 2004-2013 
The tables mentioned below explains the Descriptive Statistics, Pearson Correlation and Regression Outcomes 
for the selected set of variables in order to define the Financial Leverage of all banking firms of Pakistan listed in 
Karachi Stock Exchange from the period of 2004 through 2013. 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
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Table 2 exhibits the descriptive statistics of all banking firms of Karachi Stock Exchange with 230 observations 
of ten years pooled data set from 2004 through 2013. The mean value of 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Range Mean Std. Deviation Maximum Minimum 
FL 
TAG 
SG 
EPSSP 
CI 
FS 
ROA 
230 
230 
230 
230 
230 
230 
230 
1.095648 
13.76560 
5.925688 
3.176678 
24.45779 
2.783869 
0.293932 
0.125057 
0.315615 
0.346223 
0.020088 
1.689222 
8.145791 
0.006912 
0.161623 
1.033097 
0.611677 
0.310813 
2.523320 
0.590289 
0.032860 
1.062864 
12.81580 
5.020118 
1.021505 
24.07072 
9.234333 
0.211421 
-0.032783 
-0.949797 
-0.905569 
-2.155172 
-0.387072 
6.450464 
-0.082511 
financial leverage (FL) is 0.1250 with the maximum value of 1.0628 and minimum value of -0.0327 showing 
that banking firm rely less on debt financing than on equity. The profitability of banking firms measured by 
ROA has mean values of 0.0069. The average size (FS) of banking firms is 8.1457 with a maximum value of 
9.2343 and minimum value of 6.4504. Average value of firm size (FS) is 8.1457 which is the greater mean value 
as compared to all other variables having maximum value of 9.2343 and minimum value of 6.4504. As for 
earning per share to stock price (EPSSP) and capital intensiveness (CI) of banks concern, the mean value of CI is 
1.6892 (std. dev. = 2.5233) ranges from -0.3870 to 24.0707, showing that banking firms are more capital 
intensive as the standard deviation and maximum value of CI is higher than all other variables and the mean 
value of EPSSP is 0.0200. The maximum value of EPSSP is 1.0215, showing investment opportunities and 
minimum value is -2.1551, showing investment risk. The mean value of total assets growth (TAG) and sales 
growth (SG) is 0.3156 and 0.3462 respectively. The standard deviation values are low and the variations in these 
values are also low, it indicates that the sample firms have same characteristics. Because of the reasonable level 
in the values of standard deviation, it can be concluded from the above results of descriptive statistics that there 
is no higher fluctuations in the values of selected set of variables. 
4.3.2 Pearson Correlation Analysis 
It is quite important to observe the level of correlation between the dependent and independent variables, the 
multicolinearity problem, in order to move for further analysis. The Pearson’s correlation test has been 
conducted to observe the interaction level between the selected set of variables. If there is existence of 
correlation the regression analysis results are not acceptable because of interdependency of selected set of 
variables.  
Table 3 displays the Pearson Correlation Analysis of all variables over ten years period ranging from 2004 
through 2013. It can be seen that CI (0.3930) and ROA (0.3587) have significant positive relationship with FL 
and the FS (-0.4500) has significant negative association with FL at the significance level of 0.01. From the 
Table 3, it can be concluded that there is no high degree of correlation between the selected set of variables. 
Only the value in between ROA and EPSSP has greater association which is 0.4553, significant at the level of 
0.01. This indicates that multicolinearity does not affect the results. 
 
Table 3: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
 FL TAG SG EPSSP CI FS ROA 
FL 
TAG 
SG 
EPSSP 
CI 
FS 
ROA 
 1.0000 
-0.0171 
 0.0927 
-0.0229 
 0.3930** 
-0.4500** 
 0.3587** 
 
 1.0000 
 0.2407** 
 0.0118 
 0.0334 
-0.0118 
-0.0252 
 
 
 1.0000 
-0.0132 
 0.1562* 
-0.2559** 
 0.0057 
 
 
 
 1.0000 
 0.0332 
 0.1865** 
 0.4553** 
 
 
 
 
 1.0000 
-0.4385** 
-0.0770 
 
 
 
 
 
 1.0000 
-0.0696 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0000 
Note: *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level and **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
4.3.3 Regression Analysis 
In order to move for further analysis, the study has considered the major assumptions which are very important 
in panel data analysis. Table 4 highlights the regression results of whole period of time, 2004-2013. 
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Table 41: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Financial Leverage (FL) 
Variables Coefficient t-statistics p-value 
(Constant) 
TAG 
SG 
EPSSP 
CI 
FS 
ROA 
  
R
2
 
Adjusted R
2 
F-statistics 
0.575299 
-0.015036 
-0.027459 
-0.161715 
0.321783 
-0.211868 
0.473427 
 
0.408636 
0.384444 
16.89123*** 
3.768812 
-0.280124 
-0.473767 
-1.976521 
5.124365 
-2.897760 
7.422158 
0.000211*** 
0.779646 
0.636136 
0.049345* 
0.000001*** 
0.004138*** 
0.000000*** 
Note: *Significant at 0.10; **Significant at 0.05; ***Significant at 0.01 
Table 4 narrates in regression model that capital intensiveness (CI) has significant positive relationship with 
financing decision determined by FL (Coef.= 0.3217, t= 5.1243) at the significance level of 0.01, showing that 
the banking firms are more capital intensive. There is a negative interaction between the EPSSP (Coef.= -0.1617, 
t= -1.9765,) and FL at 0.10 level of significance. The negative value of EPSSP indicates investment risk. The 
effect of firm size (FS) on financial leverage (FL) is significant negative (Coef.= -0.2118, t= -2.8977) at the 
significance level of 0.01. Moreover, a direct correlation between the FL and the profitability of firm measured 
by ROA (Coef.= 0.4734, t= 7.4221) is found at 0.01 level of significance. As for TAG and SG concern, both 
these variables have negative but insignificant effect on the FL of banking firms as showing (Coef.= -0.0150, t= 
-0.2801) and (Coef.= -0.0274, t= -0.4737) respectively.  
4.4 Discussion 
There is a negative effect of total assets growth on banks financing decision in economic normal (2012, 2013), 
and there is no effect of total assets growth in the period of 2004 through 2011, it can be concluded that there is 
no impact of total assets growth on financing decision in high uncertainty conditions. The result does not 
confirm the balancing theory. Other proxy of actual investment, sales growth has inconsistent effect on financing 
decision. In general, the impact of realized growth on financing decision is less consistent. While in 2011, sales 
growth has statistically significant positive effect on financing decision.  
Earnings per share to stock price positively influence financing decision in the less uncertainty conditions (2011 
and 2012). The results suggest that in less risky conditions, banking firms use higher debt to finance their growth 
of future. In high risky conditions, banking firms use lesser debt to finance their growth of future. The outcomes 
are same with the balancing theory. Another proxy of investment opportunity, capital intensiveness (total equity 
to sales) positively influences financing decision in high and less risky conditions.  
 While considering the regression results of whole period from 2004 through 2013. From the Table 4, it 
can be seen that there is an inverse association between actual investment measured in terms of earning per share 
to stock price (EPSSP) and financing decision. The outcomes are consistent with Fisher separation theorem and 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993). But the outcomes are not consistent with Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Galeotti and Dieci (2000). The results are also inconsistent with Smirlock and Marshall (1983). Other investment 
opportunity, capital intensiveness measured in terms of total equity to sales has direct interaction with financing 
decision. The results are consistent with Myers and Majluf (1984) and Galeotti and Dieci (2000). Moreover, 
controlling variable firm size has significant negative linkage with financing decision and return on assets has 
positive relationship with financing decision. 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
This study investigates empirically the impact of investment decision on financing decision. To obtain the 
objectives, the data required, ranging from 2004 through 2013 is collected from the financial statements of all the 
banking firms listed in Karachi Stock exchange. Two proxies i.e. investment opportunity and actual investment 
are used for investment decision. Regression analysis is used to estimate the coefficients of interest.  
Findings of research does not support the balancing theory which suggest that there should be a positive effect of 
growth in less risky conditions and negative effect in high risky conditions on financing decision. But there is a 
negative effect of total assets growth on banks financing decision in economic normal (less uncertainty 
conditions) and no impact of total assets growth on financing decision is found in high uncertainty conditions. 
The impact of investment decision on firms financing decision depends on the risk level. The empirical evidence 
shows that firms use more debt in less risky conditions to finance their investment and use less debt in high risky 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.13, 2015 
 
118 
conditions to finance their investment. The present research shows that investment opportunity (future growth) 
influences financing decision more powerfully than actual investment (realized growth). Research results also 
show that with the help of pecking order and balancing theory, the impact of investment decision on financing 
decision can be explained. 
While considering the regression results of whole period from 2004 through 2013. Research findings show that 
there is an inverse association between actual investment (EPSSP) and financing decision. Other investment 
opportunity, capital intensiveness has direct interaction with financing decision. The association between size 
and financing decision is negative and between return on assets and financing decision is positive.  
5.1 Policy Implications  
The findings of this empirical study are beneficial for bankers and academic researchers. Results are also 
beneficial for internal and external investors while taking decision of investment in respective capital market. 
The research might be helpful for the mangers of commercial banks in order to concentrate on the factors 
actually determine the financing policy of banks; it will make them able to take more strategic approach to add 
value in the organization.   
 
5.2 Limitations and Future Directions 
i. This paper only focuses on the investment decision as determinant of financing decision. Further studies 
can examine the interdependency among the financial decisions. By developing the simultaneous equation 
model, further studies can develop the model. 
ii. This study uses only year-by-year data. Hence the future researcher can use the average values of data 
in order to avoid the discretionary accrual effect, which can be made by the firm’s managers. 
iii. The present research does not use the risk variable, such as beta, variance or standard deviation of 
return, or any other method in order to measure the risk explicitly. Further studies can include this variable as 
controlling variable. 
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